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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the State of Utah 
RAY PHEBUS, JOE T. JUHAN, and 
ASHLEY YALLEY OIL COMPANY, 
a corporation, 
vs. 
Platintiffs and 
Fetitioners 
WM. S'TANLEY D~UNFORD, Judge of 
the District Court, Uintah County, and 
N. J. MEAGHER, 
Defendamts mnd 
Besponden,ts. 
RE.S:PONDENTS' BRIEF 
Case No. 
7187 
The sole complaint of the plaintiffs here seems to 
be that the trial court in its interlocutory order of May 
4, 1948, set aside its judgment of April 15, 1946, as to 
Joe T. Juhan and Ashley Oil Company, and did not 
include therein Ray Phebus. 
It is significant that the petition for writ of man-
damus does not allege any prejudice to Ray Phebus, but 
does allege prejudice to Joe T. Juhan and Ashley Valley 
Oil Company. 
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Our position is that no one was prejudiced, unless 
it can be said that failure to set aside the judgment for 
$32.30 costs as against Ray Phebus is sufficient reason 
for this court to issue a permanent writ. We regard that 
as trivial, as a tail to tie a kite to, and a matter, more-
over, that the trial court would have acted upon im-
m·ediately if it had been called to that court's attention. 
Obviously, what disturbed the plaintiffs here was 
the injunctive feature of the judgment of April15, 1946; 
it is not difficult to surmise that they were formulating 
plans to go into possession of the real property, the 
subject of the action in the trial court, for the purpose 
of conducting drilling operations. They would, of course, 
have such right if they were the sole owners of the profit 
a prendre rights under the lease, which the trial court 
held invalid, and which this court held to be valid; 
whether they have those rights in entirety, and whether 
they would have rights of possession for drilling pur-
poses if it is held they have only fractional rights pro-
fit a prendre, are questions yet to be decided; and since 
this court did not decide them we must look in the first 
instance to the trial court for a determination. 
In any view of the case, did Ray Phebus have any 
rights of possession at the date of the trial court's 
judgment of April15, 1946~ That judgment, unlike many 
judgments in quiet title cases did not purport to settle 
issues as of the date of commencement of the action; it 
is written in entirety in the present tense. 
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Plaintiffs in their brief ( p. 31) say-
'' Phebus quitclaimed to Juhan under date of 
January 19, 1945, during the pendency of the 
action. Juhan, in part, claims by, through and 
under Phebus. If the original judgment is per-
Iuitted to stand, then Juhan is out of the pic-
ture to the extent of the interest quitclaimed to 
him by Phebus and, regardless of the intention, 
the language used by this court and the issues 
raised by the pleading at the trial, a question of 
title will have been determined. * * * '' 
If we understand the purport of that statement, it 
represents at least a novel idea in construction. We can-
not understand how a deed can be construed as passing 
something from the grantor that the grantee does not 
receive; in other words, how Phebus could be put out of 
the picture and Juhan not be put in. 
There is nothing in the interlocutory order entered 
by the trial court that even remotely suggests that the 
judge had in mind a denial to Juhan of the benefits of 
his deed from Phebus, and Juhan's rights, whatever 
they are, undoubtedly can be and will be given proper 
consideration if and when this matter is brought before 
the court for its determination. The defendant Meagher 
is not concerned whether a judgment be now entered ad-
judicating rights as of the date of commencement of 
the action, or as of the date of the trial court's judg-
ment, and obviously the defendant judge is not con-
cerned. 
It is a matter for the plaintiffs here to decide-
whether they want a decree as of the date of commence-
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ment to t he effect that Phebus had the rights, or as of 
the date of the judgment to the effect that the Phebus 
righs had then passed to Juhan. Until they present this 
matter to the trial court they are not hurt. 
We find nothing in the decision of this court to 
indicate that the trial court was not justified in its posi-
tion that Phebus was out of the picture because of his 
deed to Juhan; indeed this court in its decision, if it took 
any position on that subject, took the same position as 
the trial court seems to have taken. After stating-
"On January 19, 1945, Phebus quitelaim·ed 
his interest to Juhan.'' 
The court proceeds-
. "Briefly the above sets out the chain of title 
of the various parties concerned, leaving as in-
terested parties in the proceeding, plaintiff 
Meagher, and defendants Ashley Valley Oil Com-
pany and Juhan.'' 
We do not construe these statements as indicating 
what this court expected the trial court to do when it 
remanded the case for proceedings to conform to this 
opinion. We think the court decided one question only-
that the lease was valid and still in existence. That ques-
tjon is set at rest and neither defendant here has any 
intention of ignoring it, or trying to evaporate it. 
We think there is much to be done yet in this case, 
and the plaintiffs here seem to be in agreement. They 
say (Brief, p. 17)-
, 'But here we have a situation that requires 
affirmative action in order to h·ring about com-
plete restitution o nthe record. In a suit to quiet 
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title, where real property is involved, those 
things that affect the record and constitute clouds 
on the title become and are the controlling mat-
ters, and it is the record title that must be re-
stored and the clouds on the same expunged in 
order to bring about complete restitution.'' 
The record in this case discloses at least three types 
of right involved-title to the fee; impacts on that title 
by the rights of lesees to entry for exploration, develop-
ment and production; rights to receive royalty, original 
and overriding. This court paid no attention to the 
questions concerning who now has what rights nor what 
impact such rights, when determined, are to have on the 
plaintiff's (N.J. ~leagher) title. We agree that affirma-
tive action in the trial court is necessary; we wonder 
why the plaintiffs have not instituted such action. 
We agree with plaintiffs' position, indicated by the 
quotation from Missouri, K. & T. Trust Co. v. Clark, 
60 Neb. 406, 83 N.W. 202, 203 (Brief pp. 20-21)-
"When the judgment of a trial court has 
been reversed in an error proceeding, the court 
should retrace its steps to the point when the 
first material error occurred. It should put the 
litigants back where they were when the initial 
mistake was committed.'' 
A new or amended decree as of the date of the 
former decree, based on appropriate findings of fact 
and conclusions of law, in our opinion will do just that. 
'This was a suit to quiet title; in such proceeding the 
court has jurisdiction to determine all questions affect-
ing the title as to the respective parties. 44 Am. Jur. 
Quieting Title, Sec. 70 et seq. W ~ quote brief excerpts: 
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''Sec. 70, p. 56. Generally, the court should 
and will by its decree, adjust all the equities of 
ail the parties to the action, and determine the 
status of all controverted claims to or against 
the property. The general principle that equity, 
having taken cognizance of a cause of action, will 
decree such relief as is necessary to completely 
and finally dispose of the controversy, is ordin-
arily applicable in the actions here under con-
sideration. * * *'' 
Again at Sec. 94, p. 79 : 
"Sec. 94. * * * Generally, the decree should 
adjust all equities between the parties to the 
action, and determine the status of all contro-
verted claims to or interests in the property which 
are shown to exist at the time when the decree is 
rendered, regardless of character, whether ab-
solute or contingent, present or future. * * • '' 
Now if the court below had decided, as this court did, 
that the lease was in existence, it would logically have 
made its decree settling and adjusting all the questions 
as above indicated. Our position is that, inasmuch as 
this court settled only one question, the status of the 
lease, the court below should take- up where it left off 
and make a complete disposition of the case. 
The order made by the court below is certainly sub-
ject to the construction that the court had in mind the 
above principles, and that instead of intending to deny 
or prejudice the rights of any party, it was expressly 
designed to safeguard them. At the date of the decree the 
Phebus rights, whatever they were, had been conveyed 
by deed to Juhan. That is what the plaintiffs here claim. 
They do not claim that Phebus is prejudiced by a reeog-
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nition of that transfer, and certainly Juhan could not 
be because the order sets aside the decree in so far as it 
effected his interests. As to Ashley Valley Oil Company, 
nothing is made to appear that it would have been pre-
judiced in any way. 
The following authorities, taken from the annota-
tions in 28 U.S.C.A., Sec. 877, note numbers as indicated, 
throw additional light on this subject: 
N. 266.- 'Yhile the rule that an adjudication 
by an appellate tribunal becomes the law of the 
case on all su'bsequent trials is a wholesome one, 
which should be enforced, yet it should be con-
fined to questions that were actually conside-red 
and decided, and not extended to dicta or intima-
tions contained in an opinion which may be 
thought to foreshadow the views of the court on 
other questions. Patillo v. Allen-West Commission 
Co. (Ark. 1901) 108 F. 723, 47 C.C.A. 637. 
N. 267.- Where a decree dismissing a suit 
is reversed on appeal, and the case remanded for 
further action, only the questions which were con-
sidered and determined by the appellate court are 
concluded by its decision. General Inv. Co. v. Lake 
Shore & M.S. Ry. Co. ( C.C.A. Ohio, 1920) 269 
F. 235 modified (1922) 43 S. Ct. 106, 260 U:S.. 261, 
67 L. Ed. 244. 
Where, on appeal to the Supreme Court in an 
admiralty case, a question of recoupment was left 
open by its opinion and the mandate to the Dis-
trict Court, the latter is "at liberty to consider 
and decide the question of recoupmen, entirely 
unaffected by the mandate, and the action of that 
court in allowing or denying such recoupment is 
open to review in the Circuit Court of Appeals 
7 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
only." The New York (Mich. 1900) 104 F. 561, 44 
C.C.A. 38. 
N. 2'68.- When an appellate court definitely 
describes the decree to be entered in the court 
below, there is no discretion in the latter court, 
but its duty is to obey the mandate and enter 
the decree accordingly, and when so entered it is 
the decree of the appellate court, and an appeal 
from it will be dismissed; but if the mandate does 
not cover the entire case, but leaves something 
undetermined, and to be inquired into and ad-
judicated, or if the court below misconstrues the 
decree of the appellate court, and does not give 
full effect to its mandate, a new appeal is an ap-
propriate remedy. Great Northern Ry Co. v. 
Western Union Telegraph Co. (Minn. 1909) 174 
F. 321, 98 C.C.A. 193, certiorari denied (1910) 30 
S. Ct. 574, 216 U.S. 619, 54 L. Ed. 640. 
A judgment of reveral is not necessarily an 
adjudication of any other than the questions in 
terms discussed and decided. Chas. Wolff Pack-
ing Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations of Kan-
sas ( 1925) 45 S. Ct. 441, 267 U.S. 552, 69 L. Ed. 
785, reversing (1924) 227 P. 249, 114 Kan. 487, 
which modified on rehearing (1923) 219 P. 259, 
114 Kan. 304. 
On mandate of circuit court of appeals, re-
manding case to Supreme Court of Porto Rico 
''for further proceedings not inconsistent with 
this opinion,'' held Supreme Court properly re-
viewed case on its merits; the opinion not dis-
posing of, though incidentally referring to, facts 
and merits. Gandia v. Porto Rico Fertilizer Co. 
(C.C.A. Porto Rico, 1924) 2 F. (2d) 641. 
In suit to cancel oil and gas lease, where Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals reversed decree adverse to 
plaintiff, and ruled that he was entitled to can-
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cellation of lease, except a~ to small acreage about 
two wells already drilled, held, decree of district 
court entered on 1nandate of circuit court of ap-
peals, should have awarded full relief naturally 
applicable to plaintiff's situation, though not ex-
pressly directed, such as injunction against con-
tinued occupation or use of leased premises, ex-
cept as to the two wells and pipe line thereto, and 
order for payment of rentals then accumulated 
under tender and for accounting for value of un_:. 
authorized use of premises. White v. Dawson 
(C.C.A. Ky.1927) 18 F. (2d) 471. 
K. 269.- A procedendo is a writ from a 
higher to a lower court, directing that the case 
be proceeded with. It does not undertake to say 
what the decision shall be, but merely that there 
shall be one, and where there is a reversal the 
case is thereupon taken up in the court below at 
the point where the erroneous judgment was 
rendered. Exchange Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Warsaw-
Wilkinson Co. (Pa. 1910) 185 F. 487, 107 C.C.A. 
587, denying motion to amend mandate (1910) 
181 F. 330, 104 C.C.A. 518. 
\Vhen a decree is reversed, and the mandat~ 
does not direct the entry of any particular decree, 
but only that further proceedings be had not in-
consistent with the opinion of the appellate court, 
the effect is to put the case in the same position 
in the court below as if no decree had ever been 
entered; and the court has the same authority to 
permit amendments of the pleadings to enlarge 
the issues, and admit further proofs, as it had be-
fore the entry of the decree. Hawkins v. Cleve-
land, C., C & St. L. Ry. Co. (Ind. 1900) 99 F. 322 
39 C.C.A. 538, denying mandate motion to modify 
(1898) 89 F. 266,32 C.C.A.198. 
And in Fisher v. Hurst (Jan. 30, 1948), 68 S. Ct. 
9 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
389, quoting head note 2, the Supreme Court of the 
United States in a Per Curiam de·cision, said: 
''Whether state of Oklahoma was following 
or disobeying mandate of United States Supreme 
Court, as applied by Oklahoma district court, 
* * * should be determined in the first instance 
by Oklahoma district court, and not by United 
States Supreme Court in mandamus proceeding 
by Negro applicant to compel compliance with 
United States Supreme Court's mandate." 
We think the alternative write heretofore issued 
should be recaHed and this proceeding dismissed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
KATHERINE M. IVERS 
HERBERT VAN DA:M 
Attorneys fo'r Respondents 
10 
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